@article {18058,
	title = {A Combined Design-Time/Test-Time Study of the Vulnerability of Sub-Threshold Devices to Low Voltage Fault Attacks},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing},
	volume = {PP},
	issue = {99},
	year = {2014},
	month = {04/2014},
	abstract = {The continuous scaling of VLSI technology and the possibility to run circuits in subthreshold voltage range make it possible to implement standard cryptographic primitives within the very limited circuit and power budget of RFID devices. However, such cryptographic implementations raise concerns regarding their vulnerability to both active and passive side-channel attacks. In particular, when focusing on RFID targeted designs, it is important to evaluate their resistance against low cost physical attacks. A low cost fault injection attack can be mounted, for example, by lowering the supply voltage of the chip with the goal of causing setup time violations. In this paper, we provide an in-depth characterization of a chip implementation of the AES cipher. The chip has been designed using a 65nm low power standard cell library and operates in a subthreshold voltage range. We first show that it is possible to inject faults (through lowering the supply voltage) compliant with the fault models required to perform attacks against the AES cipher. We then investigate the possibility of predicting, at design time, which parts of the chip are more likely to be sensitive to such fault injection attacks and produce the desirable (from the point of view of the attacker) faulty behavior. Identifying such sensitive logic signals allows us to suggest to the designer a tailored countermeasure strategy for thwarting these attacks, with a minimal impact on the circuit{\textquoteright}s performance.},
	issn = {2168-6750},
	doi = {10.1109/TETC.2014.2316509},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Hocquet, C{\'e}dric and Bol, David and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Regazzoni, Francesco and Koren, Israel}
}
@article {18467,
	title = {Simulation-Time Security Margin Assessment against Power-Based Side Channel Attacks},
	journal = {(IACR) Cryptology ePrint Archive},
	volume = {2014},
	year = {2014},
	month = {05/2014},
	chapter = {307},
	abstract = {A sound design time evaluation of the security of a digital device is a goal which has attracted a great amount of research effort lately. Common security metrics for the attack consider either the theoretical leakage of the device, or assume as a security metric the number of measurements needed in order to be able to always recover the secret key. In this work we provide a combined security metric taking into account the computational effort needed to lead the attack, in combination with the quantity of measurements to be performed, and provide a practical lower bound for the security margin which can be employed by a secure hardware designer. This paper represents a first exploration of a design-time security metric incorporating the computational effort required to lead a power- based side channel attack in the security level assessment of the device. We take into account in our metric the possible presence of masking and hiding schemes, and we assume the best measurement conditions for the attacker, thus leading to a conservative estimate of the security of the device. We provide a practical validation of our security metric through an analysis of transistor-level accurate power simulations of a 128-bit AES core implemented on a 65 nm library.},
	keywords = {AES, implementation, Side-channel analysis},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Pelosi, Gerardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18074,
	title = {Simulation-Time Security Margin Assessment against power-based Side Channel Attacks},
	booktitle = {7th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security (WESS)},
	year = {2012},
	month = {October},
	address = {Tampere, Finland},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Pelosi, Gerardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18079,
	title = {Exploring the Feasibility of Low Cost Fault Injection Attacks on Sub-Threshold Devices through an Example of a 65nm AES Implementation},
	booktitle = {7th Workshop on RFID Security and Privacy (RFIDSec)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {June},
	address = {Amherst, Massachussets, USA},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Hocquet, C{\'e}dric and Bol, David and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Regazzoni, Francesco and Koren, Israel}
}
@conference {18087,
	title = {Low Cost Software Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks: Implementation and Performances Trade Offs},
	booktitle = {5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security (WESS)},
	year = {2010},
	month = {October},
	address = {Scottsdale, Arizona, USA},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Breveglieri, Luca and Koren, Israel and Pelosi, Gerardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
