@article {18482,
	title = {Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computers },
	volume = {64},
	issue = {2},
	year = {2015},
	month = {02/2015},
	pages = {329-341},
	type = {journal},
	chapter = {329},
	abstract = {We introduce a compiler that automatically inserts software countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms against power-based side-channel attacks. The compiler first estimates which instruction instances leak the most information through side-channels. This information is obtained either by dynamic analysis, evaluating an information theoretic metric over the power traces acquired during the execution of the input program, or by static analysis. As information leakage implies a loss of security, the compiler then identifies (groups of) instruction instances to protect with a software countermeasure such as random precharging or Boolean masking. As software protection incurs significant overhead in terms of cryptosystem runtime and memory usage, the compiler protects the minimum number of instruction instances to achieve a desired level of security. The compiler is evaluated on two block ciphers, AES and Clefia; our experiments demonstrate that the compiler can automatically identify and protect the most important instruction instances. To date, these software countermeasures have been inserted manually by security experts, who are not necessarily the main cryptosystem developers. Our compiler offers significant productivity gains for cryptosystem developers who wish to protect their implementations from side-channel attacks},
	keywords = {cryptographic algorithms protection, cryptography, data protection, power analysis attacks, program compilers, side-channel attacks},
	issn = {0018-9340},
	doi = {10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo, David and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@article {18060,
	title = {Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computers},
	volume = {PP},
	issue = {99},
	year = {2013},
	month = {12/2013},
	abstract = {We introduce a compiler that automatically inserts software countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms against power-based side-channel attacks. The compiler first estimates which instruction instances leak the most information through side-channels. This information is obtained either by dynamic analysis, evaluating an information theoretic metric over the power traces acquired during the execution of the input program, or by static analysis. As information leakage implies a loss of security, the compiler then identifies (groups of) instruction instances to protect with a software countermeasure such as random precharging or Boolean masking. As software protection incurs significant overhead in terms of cryptosystem runtime and memory usage, the compiler protects the minimum number of instruction instances to achieve a desired level of security. The compiler is evaluated on two block ciphers, AES and Clefia; our experiments demonstrate that the compiler can automatically identify and protect the most important instruction instances. To date, these software countermeasures have been inserted manually by security experts, who are not necessarily the main cryptosystem developers. Our compiler offers significant productivity gains for cryptosystem developers who wish to protect their implementations from side-channel attacks.},
	issn = {0018-9340},
	doi = {10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo Bruna, David and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {18072,
	title = {An eda-friendly protection scheme against side-channel attacks},
	booktitle = {Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE)},
	year = {2013},
	month = {March},
	address = {Grenoble, France},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Velickovic, Nikola and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo Bruna, David and Brisk, Philip and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {18080,
	title = {A First Step Towards Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	booktitle = {48th Design Automation Conference (DAC)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {June},
	address = {San Diego, Califorina},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@inbook {18085,
	title = {A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-resistant Instruction Set Extensions},
	booktitle = {Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
	volume = {5747},
	year = {2009},
	month = {September},
	pages = {205-219},
	publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	organization = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	address = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
	abstract = {Power-based side channel attacks are a significant security risk, especially for embedded applications. To improve the security of such devices, protected logic styles have been proposed as an alternative to CMOS. However, they should only be used sparingly, since their area and power consumption are both significantly larger than for CMOS. We propose to augment a processor, realized in CMOS, with custom instruction set extensions, designed with security and performance as the primary objectives, that are realized in a protected logic. We have developed a design flow based on standard CAD tools that can automatically synthesize and place-and-route such hybrid designs. The flow is integrated into a simulation and evaluation environment to quantify the security achieved on a sound basis. Using MCML logic as a case study, we have explored different partitions of the PRESENT block cipher between protected and unprotected logic. This experiment illustrates the tradeoff between the type and amount of application-level functionality implemented in protected logic and the level of security achieved by the design. Our design approach and evaluation tools are generic and could be used to partition any algorithm using any protected logic style.},
	isbn = {978-3-642-04137-2},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_15},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Cevrero, Alessandro and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Kluter, Theo and Brisk, Philip and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
