@conference {18083,
	title = {Fresh Re-Keying: Security against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks for Low-Cost Devices},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of Progress in Cryptology - Africacrypt},
	year = {2010},
	month = {May},
	address = {Stellenbosch, South Africa},
	author = {Medwed, Marcel and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18082,
	title = {Hardware Trojans for Inducing or Amplifying Side-Channel Leakage of Cryptographic Software},
	booktitle = {2nd International Conference on Trusted Systems (INTRUST)},
	year = {2010},
	month = {December},
	address = {Beijing, China},
	author = {Gallais, Jean-Francois and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Hanley, Neil and Kasper, Markus and Medwed, Marcel and Regazzoni, Francesco and Schmidt, Joern-Marc and Tillich, Stefan and Wojcik, Marcin}
}
@conference {67.ReEiGr07,
	title = {Power Attacks Resistance of Cryptographic S-boxes with added Error Detection Circuits},
	booktitle = {proceedings of: {\textquoteright}22nd IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems (DFT{\textquoteright}07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {September 26-28},
	address = {Rome, Italy},
	abstract = {Many side-channel attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been developed in recent years demonstrating the ease of extracting the secret key. In response, various schemes to protect cryptographic devices against such attacks have been devised and some implemented in practice. Almost all of these protection schemes target an individual side-channel attack and consequently, it is not obvious whether a scheme for protecting the device against one type of side-channel attacks may make the device more vulnerable to another type of side-channel attacks. We examine in this paper the possibility of such a negative impact for the case where fault detection circuitry is added to a device (to protect it against fault injection attacks) and analyze the resistance of the modified device to power attacks. To simplify the analysis we focus on only one component in the cryptographic device (namely, the S-box in the AES and Kasumi ciphers), and perform power attacks on the original implementation and on a modified implementation with an added parity check circuit. Our results show that the presence of the parity check circuitry has a negative impact on the resistance of the device to power analysis attacks.},
	keywords = {cryptography, fault tolerance, reliable applications, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Breveglieri, Luca and Ienne, Paolo and Koren, Israel and Paar, Christof}
}
@conference {59.ReBaEi07,
	title = {Simulation-based Methodology for Evaluating DPA-Resistance of Cryptographic Functional Units with Application to CMOS and MCML Technologies},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation (SAMOS IC 07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {July 16-19},
	address = {Samos, Greece},
	abstract = {This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from DPA and similar side-channel attacks. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of different logic styles against power analysis attacks, the non-linear bijective function of the Kasumi algorithm (known as substitution box S7) was implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and a set of attacks was performed using power traces derived from SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for CMOS, only very few attacks to MCML were successful.},
	keywords = {current mode logic (CML), differential power analysis (DPA), power simulation, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Poschmann, Axel and Toprak, Zeynep and Macchetti, Marco and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
