@conference {18486,
	title = {Instruction Set Extensions for secure applications},
	booktitle = {Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference DATE 2016},
	year = {2016},
	month = {03/2016},
	pages = {1529-1534},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	organization = {IEEE},
	address = {Dresden, Germany},
	abstract = {The main goal of this paper is to expose the community to past achievements and future possible uses of Instruction Set Extension (ISE) in security applications. Processor customization has proven to be an effective way for achieving high performance with limited area and energy overhead for several applications, ranging from signal processing to graphical computation. Concerning cryptographic algorithms, a large body of work exists on speeding up block ciphers and asymmetric cryptography with specific ISEs. These algorithms often mix non-standard operations with regular ones, thus representing an ideal target for being accelerated with dedicated instructions. Tools supporting automatic generations of ISEs demonstrated to be useful for algorithm exploration, while secure instructions can increase the robustness against side channels attacks of software routines. In this paper, we discuss how processor customization and the relative tool chains can be used by designers to address security problems and we highlight possible research directions},
	keywords = {asymmetric cryptography, block ciphers, cryptographic algorithms protection, instruction set, security applications},
	isbn = {978-3-9815-3707-9},
	url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=7459556},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@inbook {18062,
	title = {Interaction between Fault Attack Countermeasures and the Resistance against Power Analysis Attacks},
	booktitle = {Fault Analysis in Cryptography},
	series = {Information Security and Cryptography Series, Springer},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {257-272},
	publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	organization = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	abstract = {Most of the countermeasures against fault attacks on cryptographic systems that have been developed so far are based on the addition of information redundancy. While these countermeasures have been evaluated with respect to their cost (implementation overhead) and efficiency (fault coverage), little attention has been devoted to the question of the impact their use has on the effectiveness of other types of side-channel attacks, in particular, power analysis attacks. This chapter presents an experimental study whose goal is to determine whether the added information redundancy can increase the vulnerability of a cryptographic circuit to power analysis attacks.},
	isbn = {978-3-642-29656-7},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-29656-7_15},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Breveglieri, Luca and Ienne, Paolo and Koren, Israel},
	editor = {Joye, Marc and Tunstall, Michael}
}
