@article {18482,
	title = {Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computers },
	volume = {64},
	issue = {2},
	year = {2015},
	month = {02/2015},
	pages = {329-341},
	type = {journal},
	chapter = {329},
	abstract = {We introduce a compiler that automatically inserts software countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms against power-based side-channel attacks. The compiler first estimates which instruction instances leak the most information through side-channels. This information is obtained either by dynamic analysis, evaluating an information theoretic metric over the power traces acquired during the execution of the input program, or by static analysis. As information leakage implies a loss of security, the compiler then identifies (groups of) instruction instances to protect with a software countermeasure such as random precharging or Boolean masking. As software protection incurs significant overhead in terms of cryptosystem runtime and memory usage, the compiler protects the minimum number of instruction instances to achieve a desired level of security. The compiler is evaluated on two block ciphers, AES and Clefia; our experiments demonstrate that the compiler can automatically identify and protect the most important instruction instances. To date, these software countermeasures have been inserted manually by security experts, who are not necessarily the main cryptosystem developers. Our compiler offers significant productivity gains for cryptosystem developers who wish to protect their implementations from side-channel attacks},
	keywords = {cryptographic algorithms protection, cryptography, data protection, power analysis attacks, program compilers, side-channel attacks},
	issn = {0018-9340},
	doi = {10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo, David and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@article {18058,
	title = {A Combined Design-Time/Test-Time Study of the Vulnerability of Sub-Threshold Devices to Low Voltage Fault Attacks},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing},
	volume = {PP},
	issue = {99},
	year = {2014},
	month = {04/2014},
	abstract = {The continuous scaling of VLSI technology and the possibility to run circuits in subthreshold voltage range make it possible to implement standard cryptographic primitives within the very limited circuit and power budget of RFID devices. However, such cryptographic implementations raise concerns regarding their vulnerability to both active and passive side-channel attacks. In particular, when focusing on RFID targeted designs, it is important to evaluate their resistance against low cost physical attacks. A low cost fault injection attack can be mounted, for example, by lowering the supply voltage of the chip with the goal of causing setup time violations. In this paper, we provide an in-depth characterization of a chip implementation of the AES cipher. The chip has been designed using a 65nm low power standard cell library and operates in a subthreshold voltage range. We first show that it is possible to inject faults (through lowering the supply voltage) compliant with the fault models required to perform attacks against the AES cipher. We then investigate the possibility of predicting, at design time, which parts of the chip are more likely to be sensitive to such fault injection attacks and produce the desirable (from the point of view of the attacker) faulty behavior. Identifying such sensitive logic signals allows us to suggest to the designer a tailored countermeasure strategy for thwarting these attacks, with a minimal impact on the circuit{\textquoteright}s performance.},
	issn = {2168-6750},
	doi = {10.1109/TETC.2014.2316509},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Hocquet, C{\'e}dric and Bol, David and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Regazzoni, Francesco and Koren, Israel}
}
@inbook {18065,
	title = {Security IPs and IP Security with FPGAs},
	booktitle = {Secure Smart Embedded Devices Platform and Applications},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Durvaux, Fran{\c c}ois and Kerckhof, St{\'e}phanie and Regazzoni, Francesco and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier},
	editor = {Markantonakis, Konstantinos}
}
@article {18060,
	title = {Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computers},
	volume = {PP},
	issue = {99},
	year = {2013},
	month = {12/2013},
	abstract = {We introduce a compiler that automatically inserts software countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms against power-based side-channel attacks. The compiler first estimates which instruction instances leak the most information through side-channels. This information is obtained either by dynamic analysis, evaluating an information theoretic metric over the power traces acquired during the execution of the input program, or by static analysis. As information leakage implies a loss of security, the compiler then identifies (groups of) instruction instances to protect with a software countermeasure such as random precharging or Boolean masking. As software protection incurs significant overhead in terms of cryptosystem runtime and memory usage, the compiler protects the minimum number of instruction instances to achieve a desired level of security. The compiler is evaluated on two block ciphers, AES and Clefia; our experiments demonstrate that the compiler can automatically identify and protect the most important instruction instances. To date, these software countermeasures have been inserted manually by security experts, who are not necessarily the main cryptosystem developers. Our compiler offers significant productivity gains for cryptosystem developers who wish to protect their implementations from side-channel attacks.},
	issn = {0018-9340},
	doi = {10.1109/TC.2013.219},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo Bruna, David and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {18075,
	title = {Compact Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Block Ciphers in ATtiny Devices},
	booktitle = {Progress in Cryptology - Africacrypt},
	year = {2012},
	month = {July},
	address = {Ifrance, Morocco},
	author = {Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gong, Zheng and Gneysu, Tim and Heyse, Stefan and Indesteege, Sebastiaan and Kerckhof, St{\'e}phanie and Koeune, Francois and Nad, Tomislav and Plos, Thomas and Regazzoni, Francesco and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Oldenzeel, Loic Van Oldene}
}
@conference {18073,
	title = {Compact Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Hash Functions in ATtiny Devices},
	booktitle = {11th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS)},
	year = {2012},
	month = {November},
	address = {Graz, Austria},
	author = {Balasch, Josep and Ege, Baris and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Grard, Benot and Gong, Zheng and Gneysu, Tim and Heyse, Stefan and Kerckhof, St{\'e}phanie and Koeune, Francois and Plos, Thomas and Poppelmann, Thomas and Regazzoni, Francesco and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Van Assche, Gilles and Van Keer, Ronny and Oldenzeel, Loic Van Oldene and von Maurich, Ingo}
}
@conference {18079,
	title = {Exploring the Feasibility of Low Cost Fault Injection Attacks on Sub-Threshold Devices through an Example of a 65nm AES Implementation},
	booktitle = {7th Workshop on RFID Security and Privacy (RFIDSec)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {June},
	address = {Amherst, Massachussets, USA},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Hocquet, C{\'e}dric and Bol, David and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Regazzoni, Francesco and Koren, Israel}
}
@conference {18080,
	title = {A First Step Towards Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	booktitle = {48th Design Automation Conference (DAC)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {June},
	address = {San Diego, Califorina},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Brisk, Philip and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {18086,
	title = {FPGA Implementations of the AES Masked Against Power Analysis Attacks},
	booktitle = {2nd International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {February},
	address = {Darmstadt, Germany},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Yi, Wang and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier}
}
@conference {18077,
	title = {Fresh Re-Keying II: Securing Multiple Parties against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks},
	booktitle = {10th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {September},
	address = {Leuven, Belgium},
	author = {Medwed, Marcel and Petit, Christophe and Regazzoni, Francesco and Renauld, Mathieu and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier}
}
@article {18063,
	title = {Harvesting the potential of nano-CMOS for lightweight cryptography: An ultra-low-voltage 65 nm AES coprocessor for passive RFID tags},
	journal = {Springer Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
	volume = {1},
	issue = {1},
	year = {2011},
	author = {Hocquet, C{\'e}dric and Kamel, Dina and Regazzoni, Francesco and Legat, Jean-Didier and Flandre, Denis and Bol, David and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier}
}
@conference {18078,
	title = {Low Cost FPGA Implementations of the SHA-3 Finalists},
	booktitle = {10th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {September},
	address = {Leuven, Belgium},
	author = {Kerckhof, St{\'e}phanie and Durvaux, Fran{\c c}ois and Veyrat-Charvillon, Nicolas and Regazzoni, Francesco and de Dormale, Guerric Meurice and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier}
}
@conference {18083,
	title = {Fresh Re-Keying: Security against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks for Low-Cost Devices},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of Progress in Cryptology - Africacrypt},
	year = {2010},
	month = {May},
	address = {Stellenbosch, South Africa},
	author = {Medwed, Marcel and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@inbook {18085,
	title = {A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-resistant Instruction Set Extensions},
	booktitle = {Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
	volume = {5747},
	year = {2009},
	month = {September},
	pages = {205-219},
	publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	organization = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	address = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
	abstract = {Power-based side channel attacks are a significant security risk, especially for embedded applications. To improve the security of such devices, protected logic styles have been proposed as an alternative to CMOS. However, they should only be used sparingly, since their area and power consumption are both significantly larger than for CMOS. We propose to augment a processor, realized in CMOS, with custom instruction set extensions, designed with security and performance as the primary objectives, that are realized in a protected logic. We have developed a design flow based on standard CAD tools that can automatically synthesize and place-and-route such hybrid designs. The flow is integrated into a simulation and evaluation environment to quantify the security achieved on a sound basis. Using MCML logic as a case study, we have explored different partitions of the PRESENT block cipher between protected and unprotected logic. This experiment illustrates the tradeoff between the type and amount of application-level functionality implemented in protected logic and the level of security achieved by the design. Our design approach and evaluation tools are generic and could be used to partition any algorithm using any protected logic style.},
	isbn = {978-3-642-04137-2},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_15},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Cevrero, Alessandro and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Kluter, Theo and Brisk, Philip and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
