@conference {18081,
	title = {Power-Gated MOS Current Mode Logic (PG-MCML): A Power-Aware DPA-Resistant Standard Cell Library},
	booktitle = {48th Design Automation Conference (DAC)},
	year = {2011},
	month = {June},
	address = {San Diego, Califorina},
	author = {Cevrero, Alessandro and Regazzoni, Francesco and Schwander, Michael and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Ienne, Paolo and Leblebici, Yusuf}
}
@inbook {18085,
	title = {A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-resistant Instruction Set Extensions},
	booktitle = {Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
	volume = {5747},
	year = {2009},
	month = {September},
	pages = {205-219},
	publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	organization = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
	address = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
	abstract = {Power-based side channel attacks are a significant security risk, especially for embedded applications. To improve the security of such devices, protected logic styles have been proposed as an alternative to CMOS. However, they should only be used sparingly, since their area and power consumption are both significantly larger than for CMOS. We propose to augment a processor, realized in CMOS, with custom instruction set extensions, designed with security and performance as the primary objectives, that are realized in a protected logic. We have developed a design flow based on standard CAD tools that can automatically synthesize and place-and-route such hybrid designs. The flow is integrated into a simulation and evaluation environment to quantify the security achieved on a sound basis. Using MCML logic as a case study, we have explored different partitions of the PRESENT block cipher between protected and unprotected logic. This experiment illustrates the tradeoff between the type and amount of application-level functionality implemented in protected logic and the level of security achieved by the design. Our design approach and evaluation tools are generic and could be used to partition any algorithm using any protected logic style.},
	isbn = {978-3-642-04137-2},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_15},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Cevrero, Alessandro and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Kluter, Theo and Brisk, Philip and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@article {18064,
	title = {Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology},
	journal = {Springer Transactions on Computational Science},
	volume = {5430},
	year = {2009},
	month = {February},
	pages = {230{\textendash}243},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Poschmann, Axel and Groschdl, Johann and Gurkaynak, Frank and Macchetti, Marco and Toprak, Zeynep and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {59.ReBaEi07,
	title = {Simulation-based Methodology for Evaluating DPA-Resistance of Cryptographic Functional Units with Application to CMOS and MCML Technologies},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation (SAMOS IC 07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {July 16-19},
	address = {Samos, Greece},
	abstract = {This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from DPA and similar side-channel attacks. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of different logic styles against power analysis attacks, the non-linear bijective function of the Kasumi algorithm (known as substitution box S7) was implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and a set of attacks was performed using power traces derived from SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for CMOS, only very few attacks to MCML were successful.},
	keywords = {current mode logic (CML), differential power analysis (DPA), power simulation, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Poschmann, Axel and Toprak, Zeynep and Macchetti, Marco and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
